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The State of American Federalism, 2004:
Is Federalism Still a Core Value?
Dale Krane
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Heidi Koenig
Northern Illinois University
Federalism as a political issue was conspicuously absent from the 2004 presidential contest. Unlike
many previous campaigns, neither party’s candidate made much mention of problems besetting states and
localities. The war against global terrorism and the changing situation in Iraq shaped the election. Progress
was made on homeland security, but intergovernmental wrangling over federal grants continued
unabated. Federal-state feuds were common in several policy areas, including education, environmental
protection, and health care. State nances received a revenue boost as economic growth picked up, but
rising costs for Medicaid, education, employee pensions, and prisons clouded states’ nancial forecasts.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases with a federalism dimension, and these decisions plus those
of the past several years suggest the Court has moved not so much to grant more power to the states but to
prune back the power of Congress. Much of what has happened during the rst Bush administration must
be seen against the larger background of changes in the American political party system. Changes in party
organization and policy control, especially during the rst Bush administration, rearm David Walker’s
assessment that over the past quarter century American federalism has become more nationalized.
Campaigns for the oce of President of the United States begin
immediately after a president is elected. The contest becomes a nonstop
aair during the nal year leading to the election, and 2004 was no
dierent. In many ways the competition between the two candidates played
out along familiar lines, albeit more expensively and more acrimoniously
than in previous races. The incumbent, George W. Bush, won as most
incumbents do, but with the smallest margin of any reelected president in
more than a century. Because the nation was at war in Afghanistan and Iraq
and also engaged in a global war on terrorism, these conicts inuenced
the choice of the Democratic Party’s candidate and shaped much of the
ensuing debate between the president and his challenger. Domestic
issues—the economy, health care, same-sex marriage, taxes—took second
place to the question of which candidate could better protect the nation
from foreign terrorists.
Unlike recent presidential elections, neither political party devoted any
attention to questions oederalism. Whereas in the past the Republican
Party platform would include a strong commitment to restrain and reduce
federal power over state and local governments, the 2004 platform oered
no lengthy brien defense of states’ rights but only made a ‘‘tip of the hat’’
mention of traditional local control over public education as part of a
larger discussion lauding the No Child Left Behind Act. Similarly, where
the Democrats in the past spoke of the importance oederal-state
cooperation rather than competition, their 2004 platform made only one
specic policy recommendation with a federalism dimension: that the
decision to ban (or not) same-sex marriage be left to state governments.
After his reelection, President Bush’s rst two speeches also ignored
federalism. His inaugural address set out a sweeping statement about
foreign aairs when he declared that ‘‘it is the policy of the United States to
seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our
world.’’ 1 When he touched on domestic matters, Bush rearmed the
broad conservative theme that reliance on government to solve problems
reduces personal freedom and that the way to foster individual responsi-
bility is to create an ‘‘ownership society’’ and make ‘‘every citizen an agent
of his or her own destiny.’’ Bush emphasized that ‘‘self-government relies,
in the end, on the governing of the self . . . [and the] edice of character is
built in families, supported by communities with standards, and sustained
in our national life by the truths of Sinai, the Sermon on the Mount, the
words of the Koran and the varied faiths of our people.’’ 2 Although his
State of the Union address devoted much more attention to domestic
matters, the problems faced by states and localities were ignored; the only
mention of them was in a single sentence expressing gratitude for the work
of police, reghters, and others to make the homeland safer. 3
In both speeches Bush evoked presidents who considered the federal
character of the United States an important component ots governance.
So his apparent indierence to federalism was surprising. This inattention
to federal matters is also striking when contrasted to other recent
presidents who also were state governors. However, it is important to recall
Thomas Anton’s observation that ‘‘American federalism is a supremely
political institution.’’ 4 It is commonplace in American politics for
politicians to seek advantage for themselves and their supporters by
adopting dierent positions about where control of a given policy is best
located. President Bush, in successfully pushing the adoption of the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) during his rst year in oce, signaled quite
clearly that his administration preferred the locus of decision making to be
national and, furthermore, for it to be in the White House.
1Peter Baker and Michael A. Fletcher, ‘‘Bush Pledges to Spread Freedom,’’ Washington Post,
21 January 2005 (Netscape version).
2Elisabeth Bumiller and Richard W. Stevenson, ‘‘Bush, at 2nd Inaugural, Says Spread of Liberty Is
the ‘Calling of Our Time,’’’ The New York Times, 21 January 2005 (Netscape version).
3‘‘President Bush’s State of the Union Address,’’ The New York Times, 3 February 2005 (Netscape
version).
4Thomas J. Anton, American Federalism and Public Policy: How the System Works(New York: Random
House, 1989), p. 230.
A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN WARTIME
Since 1900 twelve of seventeen incumbent presidents have been reelected,
and few of those contests were as close as the 2004 election. On the
day before the election public opinion polls indicated that the two
candidates—President Bush and Senator John Kerry (D-MA)—were
essentially tied and an indeterminate result, as had happened in 2000,
remained a distinct possibility. But this time Bush obtained the popular
majority (51.2 percent to 48.7 percent) that eluded him four years earlier
and garnered 286 Electoral College votes (out of 538). The Republican
Party added to their majorities in the Senate (55 Republican, 44 Democrat,
1 independent) and the House of Representatives (232 Republican,
202 Democrat, 1 independent). Bush’s reelection made him the rst
president since Franklin Roosevelt to be reelected while his party also
gained seats in both the House and the Senate. It also made him the rst
Republican president to win reelection with majorities in the House and
Senate since Calvin Coolidge in 1924. 5 As a consequence, ‘‘Bush holds
a level of power not matched perhaps since President Lyndon Johnson
in 1964.’’ 6
The global eort to defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorists and the U.S. occupa-
tion of Iraq served as a background for the election. As a consequence, the
changing situation on these two fronts aected the fortunes of both
candidates. Reports of progress such as the establishment of an interim
Iraqi government or the capture of another terrorist leader boosted the
president’s popularity, whereas reports of problems such as the Abu Ghraib
prisoner abuse scandal and most especially the daily rise in the number of
American soldiers killed tended to aid his challenger. The war’s general
impact on the presidential contest was primarily to reinforce the two camps
into which the public had already divided itself as early as June 2004, when
opinion polls indicated that only 5 percent oikely voters were undecided.
Secondarily, the war also diverted voter attention from domestic issues such
as employment, job security/outsourcing, and health care.
The monetary costs of the invasion and the support of the provisional
coalition climbed to $130 billion by the start of the 2005 scal year and
the Government Accountability Oce (GAO) warned Congress that
the Pentagon would need additional billions to continue operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 7 Economic calculations of the war’s cost to the
American economy arrived at gures approaching $150 billion in lost
gross domestic product since March 2003, or approximately 1 percentage
5Todd S. Purdum, ‘‘Electoral Armation of Shared Values Provides Bush a Majority,’’ The New York
Times, 4 November 2004 (Netscape version).
6Michael Tackett, ‘‘‘Moral Values’ Agenda Proved Edge,’’ Chicago Tribune, 4 November 2004
(Netscape version).
7Jonathan Wiseman, ‘‘War Funds Dwindling, GAO Warns,’’ Washington Post, 22 July 2004 (Netscape
version).
point of growth. 8 Questions were raised about the management of the
$18.4 billion congressional appropriation for reconstruction purposes;
in particular, analysts in and out of the federal government estimated that
‘‘less than half of the aid in the Bush Administration’s reconstruction
package for Iraq is being spent to benet Iraqis.’’ 9 Costs for security
services, property losses and insurance, contractors’ salaries and prots,
overhead, and corruption reduced the impact of the reconstruction funds.
Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, blamed the slow pace of spending on ‘‘the incompetence of the
administration.’’ 10 These rapidly rising expenditures contributed to the
national government’s annual decit and increased pressure to cut federal
discretionary spending on domestic programs, in particular programs
aiding state and local governments. But neither candidate made much of
these costs as an election issue.
The 2004 presidential contest was dead even with three weeks to go and
remained so until the very end. Both parties and their allies engaged in
what most observers judged to be the most expensive and negative political
media war ever conducted. A total of more than $1 billion (compared with
$100 million in 1996) was spent, and during the last week money was
consumed at the rate of $10 million a day. 11 But with both sides engaged in
media blitzes, the decisive factor turned out to be old-fashioned ‘‘retail’’
politics of get-out-the-vote activities. The Democrats in 2000 had bested
the Republicans in the door-to-door ‘‘ground war,’’ and for four years the
Bush campaign team worked incessantly to build up and energize the
Republican base vote of evangelical and conservative Christians, small-town
and rural voters, pro-gun, anti–gay marriage, culturally conservative
people, and the business community, especially small-business owners. 12
Turnout, normally an advantage for Democrats, would be the key to success
for the president. 13
Both parties exceeded their expectations about the number of partisans
who voted. More than 125 million Americans, or 64 percent, voted in 2004;
this turnout was the highest since 1968, when the Vietnam war was
the principal issue. 14 A demographic breakdown of the electoral results
shows that Bush outpolled Kerry among voters who were male, white,
8Anna Bernasek, ‘‘Counting the Hidden Costs of War,’’ The New York Times, 24 October 2004
(Netscape version).
9The Los Angeles Times, ‘‘U.S. Reconstruction Money Not Reaching Iraqis,’’ Omaha World-Herald,
29 September 2004, p. 11A.
10Ibid.
11Eleanor Clift, Kevin Peraino, Jonathan Darman, Peter Goldman, Holly Bailey, Tamara Lipper,
Suzanne Smalley, and Evan Thomas, ‘‘How Bush Did It,’’ Newsweek,15 November 2004, p. 123.
12Ibid., 56.
13Je Zeleny, ‘‘Broad Turnout Strategy Gave Bush Coveted Edge,’’ Chicago Tribune, 7 November 2004
(Netscape version).
14Brian Faler, ‘‘Census Details Voter Turnout for 2004,’’ Washington Post, 26 May 2005 (Netscape
version).
married, Roman Catholic, evangelical or born again Christians, and over
thirty years old. 15 As for the issues that shaped voters’ choices, terrorism
clearly played a decisive role as three-quarters of the voters, as indicated by
postelection surveys, said they feared another terrorist attack yet also
believed the country was safer than it was in September 2001. Of those who
felt safer (54 percent of voters), four out ove voted for Bush. Seventeen
percent more voters stated they trusted Bush more than Kerry to handle
terrorism. 16 A huge 88 percent of all voters considered the war in Iraq to
be part of the war on terrorism; thus, despite the misgivings about the
administration’s conduct of the war, voters still leaned toward Bush on this
key issue.17 In Ohio, the pivotal state that determined the Electoral College
outcome, only 40 percent of voters trusted Kerry to do a good job handling
the war, compared with 58 percent for Bush. 18 Although early exit
polls suggested ‘‘moral values’’ were the most important problem facing
the nation, more detailed analysis of postelection surveys conrms that
terrorism (45.8 percent) was the most important issue, followed by
employment and job security (39.8 percent), then abortion (32.4 percent),
and gay marriage (26.3 percent). 19
Bush and his campaign managers early on established a simple image
of the president as a decisive leader and they never wavered from that
message. At the same time, the Bush team was able dene Kerry as
indecisive (a ‘‘ip-opper’’), and the Kerry organization never managed to
create an image of their candidate that appealed to a majority of voters, nor
did the Kerry team manage to seriously discredit Bush’s image. 20 Image
problems notwithstanding, it is dicult to defeat an incumbent president,
especially in wartime. With advantages in time (four years to organize) and
in money (over $150 million), the Bush organization started from a much
stronger position and was able to solidify its support in many states well
before the general election. As a consequence, the Republicans could
devote resources to states won by Gore in the 2000 election and thus reduce
the number of possible Electoral College votes Kerry could win. Though
the Republicans squeezed the electoral map on their opponents, fewer
than 70 out of the nation’s 3,043 counties shifted from Democrat to
Republican, but those 70 made the dierence. In the end, American
presidential contests come down to the Electoral College, a lesson the
nation learned in 2000.
15‘‘Survey of Voters: Who They Were . . . ’’ The New York Times, 4 November 2004, p. P4.
16Dana Milbank, ‘‘Deeply Divided Country Is United in Anxiety,’’ Washington Post, 4 November 2004
(Netscape version).
17Zeleny, 7 November 2004.
18Steve Rosenthal, ‘‘Okay, We Lost Ohio. The Question Is, Why?’’ Washington Post, 5 December
2004 (Netscape version).
19D. Sunshine Hillygus and Todd G. Shields, ‘‘Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the
2004 Presidential Election,’’ PS: Political Science & Politics, 38 (April 2005): 203.
20Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘‘Turnout Eort and Kerry, Too, Were G.O.P.’s Keys to Victory,’’ The New York
Times, 4 November 2004 (Netscape version).
HOMELAND SECURITY
Three years after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, signicant progress toward protection of the homeland can be seen,
but so can shortcomings. The principal challenges to further progress
continue to be those identied in the National Strategy for Homeland Security
issued in July 2002 by theOce of Homeland Security. 21 The formation and
institutionalization of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
out of twenty-two separate federal agenciesmoved forward, but theold adage
‘‘Rome wasn’t built in a day’’ applies. Congress has enacted thirty grant
programs to assist states and localities with antiterrorism and emergency
response activities, 22 but the usual political ‘‘games’’ associated with grant
programs continue unabated. Polls showed that voters in the presidential
election cared deeply about the issue of terrorism, yet citizens and public
ocials in many jurisdictions did not see themselves as likely targets. 23
During 2004 the DHS made impressive progress toward homeland
preparedness.
The Customs and Border Patrol made the Integrated Auto-
mated Fingerprint System operational three months ahead
of schedule and expanded the Container Security Initiative to
thirty-three ports in twenty-one nations.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement federal protective
ocers responded to 438 bomb threats and 887 calls about
suspicious packages at federal facilities.
The Transportation Security Administration, a much-maligned
unit in the DHS, made over 3,000 arrests at security checkpoints
and stopped over 6.5 million prohibited items, including
693,548 incendiary devices and 598 rearms, from going on
board aircraft.
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted
35 million background checks on persons petitioning for
immigration benets.
The U.S. Secret Service’s Operation Firewall prevented an
estimated $1 billion in fraud by arresting people active in global
cybercrime, and the Secret Service also arrested 1,957 people
for counterfeit money activities and closed 499 counterfeit
production plants. 24
21The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 16 July 2002; www.whitehouse.gov.
22Alice Lipowicz, ‘‘Finding the Money: A Guide to Where the Grants Are,’’ Securing The Homeland:
Federal, State & Local Approaches, Special Report by Governingand Congressional Quarterly(October 2004),
pp. 37–44.
23Donald F. Kettl, ‘‘Dashed Expectations,’’ Securing The Homeland, p. 8.
24U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004
Year End Review, 30 December 2004; www.dhs.gov.
Of special note is the rapid progress on the implementation of the Smart
Border Action Plan by Canada and the United States, which includes the
establishment ontegrated border enforcement teams—multiagency law
enforcement groups designed to interdict cross-border criminal and
terrorist activity. 25
The FY 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act signed by President
Bush on 18 October 2004 increased the DHS budget by $1.8 billion,
a 6.6 percent increase over FY 2004. New monies were included for
national projects such as radiation detection monitors to screen passengers
and cargo entering the country ($80 million), the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program ($340 million), Immi-
gration Enforcement ($56 million), the National Incident Management
System ($15 million), and the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate ($3.1 billion). The FY 2005 budget also allocates $4 billion to
state and local governments, of which $1.66 billion goes to state-based
formula grants, $885 million to the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
grants, and $715 million for reghter assistance. 26
On the other side of the implementation ledger, a number of reports
and studies indicate that unresolved issues and problems constrain
progress toward homeland security. The Council of State Governments
published a report highlighting several features of rural areas that pose
challenges to antiterrorism programs. 27 The report noted that public
health services are ‘‘often fragmented at the state and local levels, con-
tributing to the disparities among rural and urban hospitals’’ and that
‘‘the lack of communications interoperability among public safety and
health ocials continues to hinder preparedness, especially in rural areas.’’
The report complains that ‘‘the current system oederal funding promotes
insular planning for the various homeland security disciplines . . . and
these programs are creating ‘stovepipe’ environments in the states that
promote less integration of resources and eorts.’’ 28 The challenge of
appropriate assignment of roles and responsibilities among the frag-
mented and multiple jurisdictions typical of state and local government
is no doubt great, but Kiki Caruson, Susan MacManus, Matthew Kohen,
and Thomas Watson in their article in this issue review factors that
contribute to improved levels of regional cooperation and homeland
security preparedness in Florida.
25U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Secretary Tom Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister
Anne McLellan Highlight Progress on the Smart Border Action Plan,’’ press release, 14 October 2004;
www.dhs.gov.
26U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act of 2005, 18 October 2004; www.dhs.gov.
27Council of State Governments, Protecting Rural America: State Challenges and Solutions, Homeland
Security Brief, October 2004 (Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments).
28Ibid.
Two other reports merit attention. First, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration’s Airport Rescue and Fireghting Requirements Working Group
determined that ‘‘federal standards for airport re departments are
inadequate.’’ 29 The working group pointed to an insucient number of
reghters and re trucks at airports and recommended the adoption of
more stringent international standards for the minimum number ore
trucks and the amount ooam carried on the trucks. The Trust for
America’s Health, a nonprot organization headed by former U.S. Senator
Lowell P. Weicker Jr., conducted a study of bioterrorism readiness that
‘‘found only six states are adequately prepared to distribute vaccines and
antidotes in an emergency.’’ 30 States were evaluated on ten criteria such as
the amount of state expenditures and federal aid devoted to public health,
the number of scientists and laboratories available to test for anthrax
or plague, local concurrence with the state’s bioterror preparedness plan,
a disease tracking system in daily operational use via the Internet, legal
authority to quarantine, an increase in u vaccination rates for senior
citizens between 2002 and 2003, and a pandemic u plan. 31 Only Florida
and North Carolina met nine of the ten assessment criteria; most states met
ve or six, and Alaska and Massachusetts met only three criteria. The report
observed that the decrease in FY 2004 federal bioterrorism aid to state
governments creates unacceptable problems. The ongoing state scal crisis
in 2004 also contributed to a drop in state dollars for public health in about
one-third of the states.
The politics oederal funding continues to provoke considerable
conict and tension between the national and state governments as well
as among states and localities. Many state and local ocials agree with
Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), cochair of the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, who issued a review of the intergov-
ernmental ow oederal funds and found ‘‘half of the money set aside for
state and local governments is stuck in the funding pipeline, caught up in
state and federal bureaucracies.’’ 32 The problems of moving money from
Washington, DC, to state and local governments were addressed in a
June 2004 DHS report from a task force on state and local homeland
security funding established by Secretary Tom Ridge. The task force
identied nine major problems and made eleven recommendations. 33
A number of changes in federal and state nancial management based on
29Alan Levin, ‘‘FAA panel: Airport Fire Units Lacking,’’ USATODAY , 6 October 2004 (Netscape
version).
30Associated Press, ‘‘Report: States Slow to Prepare for Bioterror,’’ CNN.com, 15 December 2004
(Netscape version).
31Trust for America’s Health, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health in the Age of Bioterrorism,
December 2004; www.healthyamericans.org.
32As quoted in Christopher Logan, ‘‘Politics and Promises: Rhetoric Meets the Reality of a
Slowdown in Homeland Security Funding,’’ Securing the Homeland, p. 14.
33See Dale Krane, ‘‘The State of American Federalism, 2003–2004: Polarized Politics and Federalist
Principles,’’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 34 (Summer 2004): 105.
the task force’s recommendations have been implemented, and according
to William O. Jenkins, director of homeland security and justice issues at
the GAO, ‘‘the process is becoming more ecient and all levels of
government are discovering and institutionalizing ways to streamline the
grant system.’’ 34
A more dicult problem is deciding how best to allocate homeland
security funds. A provision in the 2001 USA Patriot Act guaranteed each
state at least 0.75 percent of the total appropriations for terrorism
preparedness grants. This provision distributes 40 percent of the appro-
priations and the other 60 percent is distributed according to the
proportion of a state’s population to the national population. Because of
this allocation policy, states with the least population receive the most
federal money on a per capita basis. The state with the highest per capita
homeland security funding is Alaska, which receives $92 per resident,
compared with New York ($32), California ($22), Florida ($21), and Texas
($21). The result of this imbalance in funding is that high-threat targets in
populous areas are not fully protected, whereas less populous areas are
awash with funds. Juneau, Alaska, a city of 31,000, received nearly $1 million
dollars of homeland security funding in 2004, yet the chief of police there
said, ‘‘I don’t need more stu anymore; I need more people.’’ 35
The per capita imbalance in the distribution of homeland security funds
is a contemporary example of the big state versus small state battle during
the constitutional convention. Congress has acted to address this scal
disparity by supplementing the $1.66 billion in the State Homeland
Security Grant program with an additional $855 million for the UASI
program, which ‘‘provides additional resources to those areas with greater
security needs.’’ 36 Unlike the State Homeland Security Grant program,
UASI funds must be applied for by a state’s designated homeland security
agency on behalf of high-threat, high-density urban areas designated by the
DHS secretary, and the award ounds is based on a formula that takes into
account estimates of the current threat, number of critical assets in an
urban area, population density, and total area population. Although the
UASI targets preparedness funds to urban areas, many of the other thirty
homeland security grants do not; they award funds to states. The overall
result has been to allocate homeland security funds not on the basis of
the threat of terrorism but on the traditional basis of states’ interests.
Homeland security funding has become, in the opinion of Richard Ben-
Veniste, a member of the 9/11 Commission, ‘‘a general revenue sharing
program.’’ 37
34Logan, ‘‘Politics and Promises,’’ p. 15.
35Dean E. Murphy, ‘‘Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States,’’ The New York Times,
12 October 2004 (Netscape version).
36U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Department of Homeland Security Announces Over
$2.5 Billion in Grants Nationwide,’’ press release, 3 December 2004; www.dhs.gov.
37Murphy, ‘‘Security Grants to Rural States.’’
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY MIX
Since 1993, when it ended four decades of Democratic control of the U.S.
House of Representatives, the Republican Party has changed numerous
practices and rules to strengthen its ability to enact legislation consonant
with its policy preferences. Congressional rules are not immutable, and it is
to be expected that when the majority composition of a chamber changes,
some new rules will be created. For example, House Republicans moved to
alter an ethics rule that required party leaders to step down from their
position if they came under not just federal indictment but also state
government indictment. The rule, originally enacted in 1993 to publicize
Democrat malfeasance, targeted Dan Rostenkowski, then chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, who eventually pled guilty to mail fraud. But
in late 2004, the rule was revised to protect Majority Leader Tom DeLay
(TX), three of whose aides were indicted by a Texas grand jury on charges
ollegal fundraising from corporations and illegal laundering of the funds
back to state legislative candidates. The charges allege that one of DeLay’s
political action committees sought donations from at least eight corpora-
tions and transferred the monies to the Republican National Committee,
which in turn sent the funds to seven candidates for the Texas House of
Representatives. Whether the rule stands or is so politically damaging that
it has to be withdrawn remains to be seen. The allegations by themselves
reveal the elaborate, labyrinthine machinations that are increasingly part
of the intergovernmental ow of campaign funds. The scheme was part
of a successful eort to capture control of both chambers in the Texas
legislature as a prelude to redistricting U.S. House seats in Texas, the
ultimate goal of which was to better insulate the Republican majority in the
U.S. House from capture by the Democrats. 38
As the Republican majority has consolidated its control over Congress, it
has ended several bipartisan practices. For example, it had been common
in the past (when the Democrats were the majority party) for conference
committees to be composed of members of both parties from each
chamber. Similarly, it was common for members of both parties to
participate in drafting or ‘‘marking up’’ legislation. 39 However, both of
these practices are no longer followed in all instances—for example, in the
drafting of the 2003 Medicare Act and the 2004 reforms of the intelligence
community. In the postelection congressional session in November,
Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert (IL) announced a new policy that
38R. Jerey Smith, ‘‘DeLay’s Corporate Fundraising Investigated,’’ Washington Post, 12 July 2004
(Netscape version); Glen Justice and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘‘3 DeLay Aides Facing Charges in Fund-
Raising,’’ The New York Times, 22 September 2004 (Netscape version); Charles Babington, ‘‘GOP Pushes
Rule Change to Protect DeLay’s Post,’’ Washington Post, 17 November 2004 (Netscape version).
39James MacGregor Burns, J.W. Peltason, Thomas E. Cronin, David B. Magleby, David M. O’Brien,
and Paul C. Light, Government by the People: National, State, and Local Version,20th ed. (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2004), pp. 295–298.
he would schedule a bill for a nal ‘‘oor’’ vote (i.e., a vote of the whole
House of Representatives) only if a majority of the majority Republican
party favored the legislation. 40 One immediate consequence of this
‘‘majority of the majority’’ rule is to prevent a faction of the Republican
party from joining with the minority Democrats to form a voting majority
that enacts legislation opposed by a majority of the House Republicans.
Furthermore, this new practice complicates interchamber relationships, as
exemplied in the long negotiations over the bill to reform the intelligence
community. 41
This strategy to eliminate bipartisanship, iollowedmuch further, could
produce Madison’s worst fear—tyranny of the majority. Two critical
restraints on preventing strong-willed majorities from oppressing individu-
als and minorities, according to The Federalistno. 51, are a bicameral
legislature and a federal republic. 42 But rule changes designed to emascu-
late the minority party, coupled with contemporary campaign fundraising
practices, make it possible for a majority to use its power intergovern-
mentally to ensure its ability to act without restraint by the minority.
Education
Few pieces oederal legislation have gone so quickly from a heralded
national triumph to an unwelcome intrusion into state and local aairs as
has the NCLB. 43 Passed in 2001, the act, which reauthorized the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),
reected an unprecedented, bipartisan commitment to ensuring
that all students, regardless of their background, receive a quality
education. To reach this goal, NCLB refocused federal education
programs on the principles of stronger accountability for results,
more choices for parents and students, greater exibility for states
and school districts, and the use of research-based instructional
methods. 44
Yet, just three years later, legislation protesting the act’s many provisions or
demanding Congress signicantly alter or even repeal it had been
introduced in more than half of the states. 45 The objections of state and
local education ocials are numerous and range from the national
performance goals and standardized testing to the numerous subgroups
based on race, income, and English prociency for which results must be
40Charles Babington, ‘‘Hastert Launches a Partisan Policy,’’ Washington Post, 27 November 2004
(Netscape version).
41Charles Babington and Walter Pincus, ‘‘House Leaders Expect Passage of Intel Bill,’’ Washington
Post, 7 December 2004 (Netscape version); John Diamond, ‘‘Senate Passes Bill to Overhaul
Intelligence,’’ USATODAY , 9 December 2004 (Netscape version).
42Burns et al., Government by the People, p. 275; Jacob E. Cooke, ed. The Federalist(Cleveland, OH:
Meridian Books, 1961), pp. 347–353.
43For a review of the act, see Dale Krane, ‘‘The State of American Federalism, 2001–2002:
Resilience in Response to Crisis,’’ Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 32 (Fall 2002): 10–12.
44U.S. Department of Education, NCLB: An Overview, 17 May 2005; www.ed.gov.
45Alan Greenblatt, ‘‘The Left Behind Syndrome,’’ Governing, 17 (September 2004): 40.
achieved, from the cost of compliance and insucient federal funding to
the time line within which success must be reached, from the lack of
consistent federal actions to the fears that many local schools will be
deemed as ‘‘failing.’’ 46
Secretary of Education Rod Paige acknowledged the negative reactions
to the NCLB but discounted them by saying ‘‘much of the opposition is
due to a misunderstanding of the law, although there is some opposition
fueled by guardians of the status quo who simply don’t want to change.’’ 47
But is the revolt against the NCLB the usual, to-be-expected resistance
that change eorts typically provoke? The secretary and many others inside
and outside the U.S. Department of Education recall that the minimum
competency movement of the 1970s engendered many of the same
complaints now being leveled against the NCLB; yet between 1973 and
1979 thirty-six states put in place minimum competency testing. 48 So
why the widespread and virulent state and local resistance when prom-
inent members of both parties in Congress continue to praise the NCLB’s
goals?
Some point to missteps in the act’s initial implementation such as the
requirement for the use of the same tests with all students, even though
some in a school speak little English or are special education students with
learning disabilities. 49 Some school ocials have expressed exasperation
and frustration with the requirements that test results must be reported for
as many as three dozen targeted subgroups reecting income, English
prociency, and race. For example, ‘‘a special education student who is a
Latino from a low-income home is counted in 10 dierent subgroups
across the NCLB grid,’’ 50 and unacceptable test results by any one
subgroup can doom an entire school to ‘‘failure.’’
As with almost every federal initiative, state-federal wrestling over the
amount ounds made available by Washington is a regular part of
intergovernmental relations, and it is no dierent with the NCLB. The
administration has supported modest funding, but the $10.72 billion
increase in Department of Education appropriations over the last three
years is due to congressional action. The White House insists extra
spending required to comply with the NCLB is the responsibility of state
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and local governments but ignores the fact that the NCLB’s requirements
were imposed during the worst scal crisis faced by state governments since
the Great Depression. 51 Paul Peterson downplays the NCLB’s scal price by
noting the annual average per pupil cost of testing is about $15, compared
with the average per pupil cost of education of around $8,000. 52 Testing,
however, is only one cost item, and the interventions necessary to uplift
youngsters and schools also have to be included in the act’s total price.
Several states have conducted studies of the full cost omplementation—
Ohio estimates its extra costs to be $1.5 billion annually and Hawaii
estimated the added annual costs at $30 million. Jack Jennings, director of
the Center on Education Policy, and Nancy Kober, a consultant to the
center, distill the debate over federal dollars by pointing out, ‘‘The federal
government is demanding 100 percent accountability in elementary and
secondary education, while paying just 10 percent of the bill.’’ 53 Little
wonder James Dillard II (R-Fairfax), chairman of the Education Commit-
tee, Virginia House of Delegates, proclaimed, ‘‘This is a punitive act that
uses coercion. . . . It’s costing us additional money and all kinds of pain
and suering.’’ 54
Others indict the leadership in the U.S. Department of Education for
taking an insensitive stance toward state and local ocials. In particular,
Undersecretary Eugene Hickok has been a political lightening rod because
he has ‘‘dismissed the complaints of state legislatures against the law as
‘dinner conversation,’ [and] charges that critics ‘would like to revisit
the statute to gut it.’’’ 55 It is important to note that some of the most
virulent opposition to the NCLB comes from the reddest of Republican
states—Utah, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Virginia—where state and local
ocials have a long history of resistance to federal mandates. Doug
Christensen, Nebraska commissioner of education, who has been success-
ful in wresting concessions from the U.S. Department of Education,
expressed the ire of his state and local colleagues in saying that ‘‘the entire
conversation about this has gone from an education conversation to a
political conversation. . . . Every state legislator, whether they like it or not,
ought to be angry that the evolution of No Child Left Behind absolutely
excluded them.’’ 56 A long-standing principle ontergovernmental imple-
mentation oederal programs is that success hinges on adequate and
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signicant involvement of state and local ocials in the decisions by the
lead federal agency. 57
These implementation ills notwithstanding, progress can be seen in
many school districts. Schools in need omprovement are being
identied, and many of these schools are receiving special attention from
state and local authorities. The Center on Education Policy’s study of
NCLB implementation found that
more than half of the districts with schools identied for improvement
implemented a new research-based curriculum or instruction pro-
gram, and more than one-third extended the school day or the school
year. To help identied schools, a majority of school districts reported
that they allocated resources to such strategies as increasing the use of
achievement data to inform instruction, matching curriculum with
standards and tests, and using research to inform decisions about
improvement strategies. 58
Other actions taken by school districts include the development of
supplemental educational services, especially tutoring services, as a way to
retain parental support and to reduce the number of transfers among
schools. 59 Peterson and West predict that accountability systems ‘‘soften’’
over time, but ‘‘even soft accountability systems work.’’ 60 ‘‘The political
future of NCLB and the new, more assertive federal role in education will
likely be determined,’’ according to Patrick McGuinn in his article in this
issue on the transformation oederal education policy, ‘‘by the extent and
pace of school improvement, whether the public continues to support
federal activism in schools, and the degree to which the bipartisan
consensus behind the law can continue to be sustained.’’
The feud over the NCLB did not completely eclipse other important
federal actions related to education. In late November 2004 Congress made
several changes to special education policy. State and local ocials gained
more discretion over special education, and parents had their access to
lawsuits over services provided to disabled children reduced. Previously,
school ocials had the burden of demonstrating that student behavioral
problems were unrelated to the student’s medical condition and that
they had attempted to do everything possible to assist the child. The new
legislation requires parents ‘‘to spell out their criticisms precisely before
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they can sue and stick to their original charges in seeking redress, making it
easier for school systems to anticipate and contain legal challenges.’’ 61 The
eect of these changes will make ‘‘it more dicult for parents to protect
the rights of their children,’’ argued Calvin Luker, founder of Our
Children Left Behind, an advocacy group for special education. 62 But from
the perspective of school ocials, it will be easier for them to remove
disruptive students and avoid costly lawsuits. Bruce Hunter, representing
the American Association of School Administrators, pointed out the new
requirements will bring parents and school ocials together in a ‘‘last ditch
eort’’ to forge an agreement before going to court. This requirement
alone will solve problems and save school districts considerable money. 63
Congress also changed the formula for college aid so that students
whose parents earn between $35,000 and $40,000 per year would lose their
Pell grants. The change would save the federal government approximately
$270 million but would reduce the number of students eligible for Pell
grants by about 84,000. 64
Energy and the environment
Controversy continued to characterize Bush administration environ-
mental policies. Immediately after the 2004 presidential election, Senator
John McCain (R-AZ) publicly labeled Bush’s position on greenhouse gases
and climate change as ‘‘terribly disappointing.’’ 65 McCain’s statement was
merely the most recent complaint in a litany of criticism that has done little
to deter Bush from changing the direction oederal environmental policy.
For Bush, the development of additional energy resources and the
protection of the environment are not mutually exclusive options, as he
stated in the introduction to his National Energy Policy: ‘‘America must
have an energy policy that plans for the future, but meets the needs of
today. I believe we can develop our natural resources and protect our
environment.’’ 66 Michael Leavitt, director of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in 2004, elaborated on the administration’s view on energy
and environment by observing, ‘‘There is no environmental progress
without economic prosperity. Once our competitiveness erodes, our
capacity to make environmental gains is gone. There is nothing that
promotes pollution like poverty.’’ 67
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Also important to Bush’s policy is the administration’s use of various
administrative tools, or what Denise Scheberle in an article in this issue
labels as the ‘‘stealth dimension’’ of the federal matrix, to implement its
policy objectives. For example, instead of relying primarily on legislative
initiatives, where Bush has not always been successful, the president via
executive orders has accelerated the approval process for permits to drill
on federal lands. The number of approved permits grew from 900 in 2000
to 1,600 in 2004. The action to approve drilling permits more quickly
resulted in a large number of resignations by U.S. Department of the
Interior personnel. 68
To oversee the new policy course, Bush appointed to positions in the
Department of the Interior several people with direct connections to the
energy industry, such as Deputy Secretary J. Steven Griles and Assistant
Secretary Rebecca Watson. Interior ocials have responsibility to manage
federal lands to foster ‘‘multiple use’’ among competing interests such as
environmental protection, energy development, outdoor recreation and
tourism, ranching, and the protection of endangered species. The Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Department of the Interior, oversees the
development oand-use plans, and it is these plans that have become the
administration’s policy tool of choice. It should be noted that the land-use
plans are not subject to congressional oversight. Typically, BLM civil
servants develop the plans, but the administration, as part ots eort
to push energy development, farmed out the revision to ‘‘corporations,
including several large multinational consulting rms with extensive
government contracts.’’ 69 Revised plans opened federal lands in Colorado,
Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming to drilling for gas and oil.
Local opposition by ranchers, outdoors men, and the recreation industry
did not deter the BLM from expediting energy projects. Federal workers
have even been ordered to stop surveys designed to identify areas oederal
land that might merit designation as a federal preserve prohibiting any type
of development. 70
But the Department of the Interior is not the only administrative agency
within which the new policy direction prevails. The EPA’s revision of the
New Source Review rule, which applies to stationary sources of air
pollution, altered the requirements so that existing power plants would
have a 20 percent annual margin when making repairs before the federal
pollution control limit is violated. Just as the new policy actions caused a
split among BLM civil servants, the New Source Review revision has created
division between the politically appointed EPA ocials and the agency’s
legal sta responsible for enforcement. Although the nal rule has not yet
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been implemented because oegal challenges to it, the EPA’s own
inspector general Nikki L. Tinsley (appointed by President Clinton) issued
a report stating the revised rule ‘‘seriously hampers’’ the EPA’s ability to rely
on lawsuits to enforce air quality. 71 Senator James M. Jeords (Ind.-VT),
commenting on the inspector general’s report, stated, ‘‘This report is
further evidence that the Bush Administration has been trying to gut the
enforcement of the Clean Air Act since coming into oce.’’ 72
Bush’s preference for executive orders and other top-down administra-
tive controls undercuts the ten years of progress achieved under the
National Environmental Performance Partnership System described by
Scheberle in this issue. Likewise, John Hoornbeek demonstrates in his
analysis of state water pollution policies in this issue that the adminis-
tration’s reliance on a command-and-control regulatory approach is
counterproductive as federal policy because it ignores other ‘‘federal
policy options available which can foster more active programs at the state
level without specifying particular solutions for variable problems.’’
Health care
The cost and quality of medical care continued to be a serious concern
for American families, and they were issues in the 2004 elections. The claim
that the best ways to reduce long-term health care costs were to foster
competition among all health providers (public and private) and to entice
more private health providers into the health-care market was an important
rationale for the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modern-
ization Act of 2003 (MMA). 73 But the unrelenting rise in the costs of private
health plans prompted members of Congress to question the wisdom of
moving seniors out of traditional Medicare and into private health
programs. A report issued by the federal Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission stated that Medicare paid private providers an average of
107 percent of the average cost for patients under the traditional public
fee-for-service program, and in rural counties the payments approached
123 percent of the average for traditional Medicare. These large
overpayments constituted a subsidy for private providers, and as noted by
former Senator Dave Durenberger (D-MN), ‘‘there appears to be no good
reason why private plans should be given more money per capita than is
given through the traditional fee-for-service system.’’ The problem is a
growing one, with 11.5 percent of Medicare’s 41 million beneciaries
already in private plans and the MMA’s incentives for competition just
beginning to take eect. Private providers argued they deserve additional
monies to create health networks in rural areas as well as to pay for services
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beyond those oered by traditional Medicare. 74 But the GAO reported that
‘‘the Bush Administration had improperly allowed some private health
plans to limit Medicare patients’ choice of health providers, including
doctors, nursing homes and home care agencies.’’ Furthermore, the GAO
said private plans overall ‘‘had increased out-of-pocket costs for the elderly
and had not saved money for the government, contrary to predictions by
Medicare ocials.’’ 75
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) continued
to encounter complaints and obstacles as it implemented the MMA.
Secretary Tommy Thompson announced a new feature on the Medicare
Web site (www.medicare.gov) that made possible price comparison among
similar brand-name pharmaceuticals. The purpose of the new feature,
according to the secretary, was to oer doctors and patients information
they could use ‘‘to choose less expensive drugs providing benets similar or
identical to those of high-cost medications.’’ Presumably, the availability of
these data would boost competition among drug manufacturers. However,
drug companies objected to the new feature and emphasized that similar
medicines can have dierent eects in dierent patients. Secretary
Thompson pointed out that the Web site information was part of the
DHHS’s work to implement the MMA’s requirement that it perform
research on the ‘‘comparative clinical eectiveness’’ of drugs. 76 At the same
time, the DHHS and the drug manufacturers also argued over the scope of
the federal formulary—the list of drugs approved for reimbursement by
Medicare. Manufacturers want the list to be large so that most if not all of
their medications qualify, but insurers and drug benet managers prefer a
list limited in number and type of drug. How expansive or how restrictive
the formulary will be will have an important eect on future Medicare
costs.77
The initial confusion surrounding the MMA’s temporary discount drug
benet led to a slow sign-up of Medicare beneciaries, and this forced the
DHHS to send discount cards to eligible low-income individuals who had
not yet applied by the end of Summer 2004. Part of the DHHS’s concern
was that seniors who did not sign up by 31 December 2004 would lose half
of the $1,200 pharmaceutical drug credit in 2005. 78 The Bush administra-
tion received some good news as a study by the Kaiser Family Foundation
estimated that 29 million of the 41 million Medicare beneciaries would
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sign up for the MMA’s drug benet when it became fully available in 2006.
Furthermore, the study also predicted that 65 percent of those who sign up
would spend less on prescription drugs, 25 percent would spend more, and
10 percent would spend about the same. 79
In a related matter, the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers (NAIC), which represents state government insurance regulators,
objected to a proposed federal rule that would require health insurers ‘‘to
tell policyholders that the Medicare drug benet provided ‘greater value’
than did the drug coverage available to people with private Medigap
insurance.’’ This statement was posted on the DHHS’s Web site. The NAIC
opposed the rule’s language because (1) the claim was not necessarily
true, (2) it ‘‘sounds a little too much like advertising,’’ and (3) the federal
government had not consulted with the NAIC, as required by law. 80
Perhaps the biggest disappointment to date with new initiatives
contained in the MMA is the widespread reluctance of employers and
individuals to use the provision for health-care savings accounts. The
savings accounts oer lower-cost but high-deductible insurance to cover
medical care, and the logic behind them is that allowing health consumers
to save money tax free would reduce unnecessary and wasteful health
expenses. Insurance companies report that only small numbers of
employers and employees are switching to plans built with health savings
accounts. Analysts suggest that the plans are untested and too new to attract
many employers and may not be aordable for average workers because of
high deductibles. Equally problematic is that the health accounts oer no
savings for chronically ill people. 81
The federal-state feud over the importation of prescription drugs raged
on as states became more assertive and creative in their eorts to nd
alternative and lower-priced sources of pharmaceutical drugs. For example,
Maine governor John Baldacci (D) gave the Penobscot Indian Nation
$400,000 to build a warehouse and establish a program to distribute
imported drugs; in eect, the Penobscots would become the state’s
designated wholesaler of medicines. 82 Governors Rod Blagojevich (D-IL)
and Jim Doyle (D-WI) held a news conference in October 2004 to
announce the ‘‘I-Save R x’’ program, which would use a Canadian company
to buy and distribute medicines purchased from forty-ve wholesalers
and retailers in Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Blagojevich
claimed the initiative would lower drug costs for Illinois and Wisconsin
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residents by 25–50 percent. The governor justied the new program as a
response to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) denial of his
petition for the state to launch a pilot program to buy drugs from Canada. 83
Missouri and Kansas joined I-Save R x by the end of 2004, and in early 2005
the Vermont legislature voted to join the program. 84 Numerous states and
cities put up Web sites linking their states with pharmacies in Canada so
their residents could buy drugs at lower costs and with assurance about
their quality. 85 It should be noted that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
(R-CA) vetoed several bills permitting California to become active in drug
importation. 86
The FDA rearmed its opposition to state government importation of
prescription drugs and charged that I-Save R x, as well as Maine’s use
of an Indian tribe, was illegal and unsafe. Despite its strong words, the
FDA did not stop states from maintaining Web sites linked to Canadian
pharmacies. 87 The duration and intensity of the federal-state feud over
imported medicines as well as other aspects of the nation’s health-care
arrangements, according to William Weissert and Edward Miller’s review of
state pharmacy assistance programs in this issue, has the potential to stymie
future innovation and risk taking by state governments.
The FDA also found itselncreasingly embroiled in allegations that it
had become too closely aligned with drug manufacturers and had
approved some medications without sucient testing to detect serious
side eects such as heart attacks, strokes, and birth defects. 88 The FDA
suered further embarrassment when it was informed by Chiron, a British
rm, that bacteria had been found in its inuenza vaccine and that the
British government had pulled the company’s license. The eect of the
action by the British authorities was to cut in half the anticipated vaccine
supply for the 2004–2005 u season in the United States. 89 The FDA was
forced to ration the vaccine, and this provoked fears that not all high-risk
persons would receive u shots. Several governors went shopping for
vaccine overseas and were able to purchase some additional doses. 90
On another health front, the White House drug czar John Walters
initiated a national campaign against substance abuse, targeting the rapidly
83Courtney Flynn, ‘‘State Starts Drug Import Plan,’’ Chicago Tribune, 5 October 2004 (Netscape version).
84‘‘States Look to Europe for Prescription Drugs: Canadian Government Considers Shutting Down
Flow to U.S.’’ CNN.com, 17 January 2005 (Netscape version).
85Belluck, ‘‘Maine and One of Its Tribes.’’
86John M. Broder, ‘‘Schwarzenegger Vetoes Bills Seeking Drugs from Canada,’’ The New York Times,
1 October 2004 (Netscape version).
87Flynn, ‘‘State Starts Drug Import Plan.’’
88Gardiner Harris, ‘‘F.D.A. Failing in Drug Safety, Ocial Asserts,’’ The New York Times, 19 November
2004 (Netscape version); Gardiner Harris, ‘‘Regulation Redened: AT F.D.A, Strong Drug Ties and
Less Monitoring,’’ The New York Times, 6 December 2004 (Netscape version).
89Anita Manning, ‘‘FDA Red-Flagged Flu Vaccine Factory,’’ USATODAY , 11 October 2004 (Netscape
version).
90Gardiner Harris, ‘‘Complaints Build across the Nation on Flu Vaccine Supplies,’’ The New York Times,
19 October 2004 (Netscape version); Monica Davey, ‘‘Illinois Governor Seeks Vaccine Abroad,’’ The
New York Times, 25 October 2004 (Netscape version).
increasing use of methamphetamine, painkillers such as OxyContin, and
stimulants, particularly Ecstasy. Walters urged (1) stronger state control of
ingredients to make meth, especially pseudoephedrine, which is a major
component of over-the-counter decongestant medicine; (2) state estab-
lishment of programs to monitor sales of prescription drugs such as
OxyContin; and (3) more vigorous local law enforcement eorts to control
promoters of ‘‘raves’’ (underground electronic music parties) because
Ecstasy is often part of the rave scene.
Less Taxing, More Spending, and Deeper in Debt
President Bush signed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
357) on 22 October 2004, making him a perfect ‘‘four-for-four’’ on tax cut
proposals enacted into law during his rst term—a record of success
achieved by few of his predecessors. But the passage of this most recent tax
cut engendered more conict and opposition than the previous three. The
White House had to overcome opposition by moderate Senate Republicans
and Democrats over the act’s permanent extension of the 2001 and 2003
tax cuts. Senators concerned about the burgeoning decit had insisted
through the summer on the adoption of a ‘‘pay-as-you-go’’ (or ‘‘pay-go’’)
approach that would require any extension of existing but temporary tax
cuts or the enactment of new tax cuts to be oset by spending decreases
or increases in other taxes. 91 Other senators, including Charles Grassley
(R-IA), opposed a change in the 2001 child-care tax credit that would have
reduced or eliminated the credit for 4 million of the estimated 11 million
low-income families who qualied for this benet. 92 Last-minute opposi-
tion came from Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) because the bill did not
include a proposal to grant $2 billion in tax credits to companies that had
continued to pay their employees on active military duty. 93
One might have expected campaign politics to fuel opposition to
$136 billion in corporate tax breaks, but not only did the Democrats not
have the votes to stop the tax bill, but they and their presidential candidate
also could not vigorously oppose several key provisions, including a ve-
year extension of the $1,000 child-care credit, a four-year reduction of
the ‘‘marriage penalty’’ on two-income families, a six-year extension of the
lowest 10 percent tax rate, and a one-year hold on growth of the alternative
minimum tax. 94 At best, the Democrats could try to make the case that
the new tax reductions would make the decit worse, but that argument
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carried little weight with most voters. Nor were many voters concerned that
corporate taxes had fallen to their lowest level since 1988. 95
Ultimately, passage of the 2004 act rested on a ‘‘feeding frenzy’’ by
interest groups that would benet from the $76.5 billion in new tax relief
for U.S. manufacturers. In fact, ‘‘House and Senate leaders openly invited
lawmakers and industry groups to draw up their own wish list for special tax
provisions.’’ 96 Key features of the act include a broader denition of
manufacturing so that it covers oil and gas producers, architectural and
engineering rms, and music companies. Other benets go to NASCAR
racetrack owners, native Alaskan whalers, corn farmers, and shipbuilders.
Also included are a $10.1 billion dollar buyout for tobacco farmers and a
new deduction for state and local sales taxes paid by residents who live in
states without a state income tax (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming). 97 The American Jobs Creation Act,
according to Keith Ashdown, vice president of the nonpartisan group
Taxpayers for Common Sense, ‘‘was a perfect storm for pork, in that they
added all of these provisions that were really important to lawmakers in an
election year.’’ 98
Whatever one’s assessment of the 2004 act, the simple fact is that Bush’s
four proposals to cut taxes succeeded more than the administration
imagined and amount to almost $1.9 trillion in tax reductions over a ten-
year period. 99 The recipe for this success is obvious: wrap a wide array of
cuts for targeted interests in a thin blanket of highly popular and dicult-
to-oppose tax cuts for low- and middle-income families. Although this
policy design may be excellent electoral strategy, Robert Bixby, executive
director of the Concord Coalition, points out that in the long term it
merely ‘‘postpones all the hard choices on the decit.’’ 100
Although Congress enacted tax cuts before the election, the Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 2005 became law three weeks after the election
by votes of 344 to 51 in the House and 65 to 30 in the Senate. Two issues
delayed its passage. First, House conferees’ support for a ban on abortion
services or referrals prompted a ght with Senate conferees. The House
proposal aected approximately half of the states that use state dollars to
oer abortion services to Medicaid recipients. 101 A second obstacle to nal
approval of the appropriations bill emerged suddenly when it was
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discovered at the last minute that the bill contained a provision allowing
the chairman of the House or Senate appropriations committees to
designate agents who would have the authority to examine a person’s tax
returns. When this unprecedented provision became widely known, it was
quickly denounced as ‘‘a Saturday night massacre on Americans’ privacy’’
by House minority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and embarrassed
Republicans rushed to remove the provision. 102
Although House Republicans labeled the $388 billion budget bill as
‘‘a lean and clean package,’’ 103 it was, in the words of Senator John McCain
(R-AZ), ‘‘one big fat turkey . . . but this bird is not loaded with the
traditional stung, it is packed with pork.’’ 104 Congressional leaders
managed to adhere to the administration’s demand to hold expenditure
growth to 1 percent, while at the same time lling the budget bill with a
wide spectrum of perks and pork. Taxpayers for Common Sense counted
11,772 earmarked special projects totaling $15.78 billion, or about
4 percent of the FY 2005 budget bill. 105
Most agencies suered an across-the-board expenditure cut of
0.8 percent, which along with the 3.5 percent raise in civil service pay
eectively reduced agency spending by more than 4 percent, especially that
of agencies with larger workforces. However, some programs did see
increases such as the Women’s, Infants’, and Children’s (WIC) nutrition
program (13 percent), the Section 8 housing program (5 percent), the Low
Income Housing Energy Assistance program (15 percent), and Head Start
(1 percent). 106
Members of both parties expressed dismay over the budget process itself.
For three years in a row, the budget was passed at the last minute in the
form of an omnibus bill rather than in the traditional form of thirteen
separate and specic appropriations bills. Even worse, this last-minute
procedure meant that most members of Congress had not read the
3,300-page bill. This new procedure creates opportunities for what Robert
Reischauer, former Congressional Budget Oce director, sees as ‘‘legisla-
tive mischief.’’ Senator McCain states, ‘‘We’ve reached the bizarre point
where we approve hundreds of billions of dollars of bills without anyone
seeing them. And then we’re shocked—shocked!—that a provision [the tax
privacy issue] could sneak in that is onerous.’’ 107
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Worries over earmarks and the budget process are important, but
more worrisome is the failure by Congress and the president to address the
cost of entitlement programs. After all, domestic discretionary spending,
of which earmarks are a relatively modest portion, constitutes only
one-seventh of the $2.3 trillion federal budget. The consequences of
unrestrained growth in federal expenditures coupled with multiple rounds
of tax cuts are a federal debt in excess of $4 trillion. If one adds the national
government’s liabilities for Medicare and Social Security, this gure
increases by tenfold. Total federal, state, and local government debts and
liabilities equal $53 trillion, or $473,456 per household, which is 5.6 times
what each household owes in personal debt ($84,454). Medicare and Social
Security spending in FY 2004 increased by $45 billion, compared with the
FY 2004 budget of $28 billion for the DHS. The Congressional Budget
Oce and the GAO have reported these gures and have recommended
various combinations of benet cuts, expenditure reductions, and tax
increases to pay for federal government obligations. 108 Leaders of both
political parties are well aware of this scal situation; unfortunately, as
C. Eugene Steuerle, a widely respected economist at the Urban Institute,
complains, ‘‘It’s a game of chicken, and nobody’s moving even though we
have a crash coming.’’ 109
THE STATES
The 2004 election results at the state level ran somewhat against the
national results. Of the eleven states holding gubernatorial elections, six
produced Democratic winners. As for state legislatures, Democrats took
power in seven, Republicans gained control in four, and a split occurred in
one state. After the elections, Republicans held twenty-eight governorships
and 3,658 state legislative seats, compared with twenty-two governorships
and 3,656 state legislators for the Democrats. It should be noted that the
Democrats acquired sixty more legislative seats, an important increase from
the 2002 elections. Republicans control both legislative chambers in
twenty-one states and Democrats do so in seventeen states; eleven states
have divided legislatures, and one is ocially nonpartisan, although a
majority ots members are Republican. If one includes the governorship
in the equation, Republicans control the executive and legislative branches
in twelve states, the Democrats exercise power in seven states, and twenty-
nine states exhibit divided government. 110
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What is somewhat surprising about these state-level results is that in
several states where the Republican national ticket did well, Republicans
did not do as well at the state level. For example, citizens in the red states of
Colorado and Montana voted for President Bush but gave both chambers
in Colorado and the Senate in Montana to the Democrats (the Montana
House is split 50–50). In North Carolina, another red state, Democrats
returned to power in the state lower chamber and increased their margin in
the upper chamber. That citizens vote dierently for dierent oces is a
long-standing feature of elections in the American federal system. In many
cases issues motivating voter choices at the state level are dierent from
those impelling their choice at the national level (e.g., North Carolina).
In other situations the state party engages in destructive actions, whereas
the national candidate remains attractive (Colorado). In other cases the
national candidate is personally popular but the policies pursued by the
national candidate upset some voters who then take their dislike out on
state-level candidates (Montana). 111
Citizens in 34 states also voted on 163 ballot propositions. Constitutional
amendments to ban same-sex marriage passed by margins of three-to-one
in ten states (AR, GA, KY, MI, MS, MO, ND, OK, OH, and UT) and by
56 percent in Oregon. Earlier in the year voters in Louisiana and Missouri
supported constitutional bans on same-sex marriages. These state-level
results contrast with the failure in Congress to pass the presidentially
supported constitutional amendment to dene marriage as being only
between a man and a woman, thus also prohibiting civil unions for gay
people. 112
In contrast to the controversy engendered by proposals to ban same-sex
marriage, measures to reduce trac congestion met little opposition.
Twenty-three of thirty-one proposals in support of new or expanded bus
and rail lines in eleven states were approved, as were nineteen of twenty-
four propositions to raise taxes or issue bonds to pay for roads and bridges.
‘‘Public transportation won almost everywhere. . . . It was astonishing how
much was passed,’’ enthused Stephanie Vance, a program manager at the
Center for Transportation Excellence, a nonprot research organiza-
tion. 113 Voters in California and Missouri approved measures stopping the
diversion of highway funds to other types of activities. Matt Jeanneret,
a transportation lobbyist, claimed the support for transportation ‘‘speaks
volumes to what voters see as a very important problem. . . . People are
clamoring for relierom trac congestion. . . . The voters are way ahead of
the politicians on this.’’ 114
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Other state ballots contained a diverse range oocal hot-button issues: 115
Alaskans rejected a measure to decriminalize marijuana, but
Montana voters legalized cannabis for medical purposes—
becoming the tenth state to do so.
California, Nebraska, and Washington voters rejected various
gambling proposals; however, Oklahomans approved a state
lottery, the installation of slot machines at horse tracks, and an
expansion of tribal gambling activities.
Arizonans approved a measure to require proof of citizenship
to register to vote and proof ommigration status to receive
certain social services. The measure also requires state employ-
ees to report to federal authorities any person who applies for
public benets but does not have the proper immigration status.
Californians defeated a proposal to ease the state’s ‘‘three
strikes and you’re out’’ rule.
Florida and Nevada voters approved raising the state minimum
wage to $6.15.
Alabama voters failed to approve a constitutional amendment
that would have erased segregation-era language in the state’s
constitution that requires separate schools for ‘‘white and
colored children.’’ The failed amendment would have also
eliminated language related to poll taxes, a practice now illegal,
but once used to prevent blacks from voting.
Arkansas, Nevada, and Washington voters defeated ballot
measures to increase education funding.
Floridians and Nevadans approved proposals to limit medical
malpractice awards, but Oregon and Wyoming voters chose
not to.
Maine voters defeated a proposal to cap property taxes at
1 percent of assessed value.
Indiana voters approved a constitutional change that will
permit state legislators to rewrite property tax laws.
South Dakota voters refused to exempt groceries from state and
city sales tax.
Colorado,Montana,andOklahomavoters raisedtaxesoncigarettes.
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Californians’ habit of adopting policies at odds with Washington, DC,
continued when the state’s voters approved Proposition 71 to spend
$3 billion during the next decade for research on human embryonic stem
cells. 116 The measure also establishes the California Institute of Regener-
ative Medicine to oversee the annual award of approximately $300 million
in grants and loans to public and private research organizations. The
institute and the grants will be paid for by $3 billion in state general
obligation bonds estimated to cost $6 billion over thirty years. California
voters took their cues from Governor Schwarzenegger, who organized a
coalition of business entrepreneurs, scientists, Hollywood glitterati, and
former rst lady Nancy Reagan. After Proposition 71 was approved, Daniel
Perry, president of the National Coalition for the Advancement of Medical
Research, proclaimed, ‘‘Californians have sent a strong signal to Capitol
Hill—Don’t delay research, don’t delay cures, and don’t delay hope.’’
Opponents lamented their loss by emphasizing not only the moral
dimension of the measure but also its nancial implications. Judie Brown,
president of the American Life League, issued a written statement saying,
‘‘The moral bankruptcy exhibited by those who voted for this measure,
which endorses the destruction onnocent human beings, could be
followed by a matching scal bankruptcy.’’ 117 That Californians, whose
state still had a huge budget shortfall, would make a huge $3 billion dollar
bet on a specic industry was explained simply by Lt. Governor Cruz
Bustamante, who stated, ‘‘It’s this century’s gold rush.’’ Wayne C. Johnson,
a leading opponent of Proposition 71, agreed with Bustamante’s observa-
tion by noting, ‘‘There’s a lot more truth there than he intended. Three
billion dollars is a lot of money, and there’s a potential for a lot people
to get very, very wealthy without accomplishing any public good.’’ 118
Certainly, the approval of Proposition 71 creates one of the most expensive
and politically controversial policy experiments ever conducted by one of
America’s ‘‘laboratories of democracy.’’ Its success or failure will have
enormous repercussions for public support not just of medical research but
also for other emerging technologies, and it denitely will shape the course
of the moral debate over the use of human embryos.
The electoral victories by conservative religious advocates of same-sex
marriage bans will give additional impetus to other parts of the Christian
political agenda such as abortion and evolution. More and more of this
activity will be aimed at state legislators and state judges because state
governments exercise ‘‘police powers’’ to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of citizens and this authority has long been held to encompass
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moral issues. Michael Bowman, director of state legislative relations for
Concerned Women for America, a conservative Christian advocacy group,
explained it is on the state level ‘‘where most family issues are decided.’’ 119
No doubt in those states where Republicans have gained control of both
legislative chambers and the governorship (e.g., Georgia, Texas) one can
expect the introduction oegislation to limit or ban abortion, prevent
human cloning, and alter school curricula to incorporate ‘‘intelligent
design’’ as an alternative view about the creation of the universe and the
origins oife.
However, the success of Proposition 71 in California and the continued
legalization of gambling and medical marijuana suggest that in a number
of states proponents of conservative moral policies will encounter sti
opposition. Furthermore, legislators usually are reluctant to move quickly
to adopt policies radically dierent from those already in the state code.
For example, bills preled in Missouri to stop schools from teaching about
contraception and to teach only abstinence will likely see opposition not
only from public health advocates but also from manufacturers of
contraceptive devices and drugs. Nevertheless, the growing political clout
of Christian religious groups, as indicated by the number of elected ocials
who publicly espouse the causes advocated by Christian groups, will create
an additional axis ossue conict and will result in the further polarization
of state policymaking.
State Finances—Possibly a Respite, but Fiscal Pressures Not Likely to Disappear
Signs of a respite, if not a recovery, nally appeared in the fourth year of
the state government scal crisis that began in 2001. That only fteen states
in FY 2004 had to cut their already enacted budgets by about $2.2 billion,
compared with FY 2003, when 40 states had to cut their enacted budgets
by $11.8 billion, was seen as a positive sign. Other FY 2004 scal actions
(or nonactions) taken as positive signs included that (1) only eight states
raised taxes, (2) two states cut taxes, (3) thirty-ve states had revenues
that exceeded projected amounts, (4) general fund spending increased
by 3 percent over the previous year, and (5) only one state decreased cash
benet levels for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families recipients. 120
Scott D. Pattison, executive director of the National Association of State
Budget Ocers, summed up the past budget year by emphasizing
the ‘‘relative improvement from the scal malaise of the past few years,’’
but he also pointed to dangers still lurking for state purses by noting that
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‘‘the states’ scal situation will remain dicult for the foreseeable
future.’’ 121
The improvements in state revenues were viewed cautiously, more as a
temporary reprieve than as an indicator of recovery, because other
elements of state budgets raised red ags. The aggregate state budget
gap in 2004 (i.e., the gap between projected revenues and projected
expenditures) was $36.3 billion, and two-thirds of the states exhibited a
budget gap. California, in particular, experienced a 2004 gap of $30 billion.
To close these budget shortfalls most states had, once again, to restrain
spending, use reserve and other funds, reduce or freeze the state
workforce, and raise fees and other nontax revenues. 122 The budget gap
resisted closure because tax revenues, although trending upward, have only
returned to 1998 levels. 123 Perhaps the most important indicator of state
nancial ability to respond to future situations is a state’s total balance,
which is composed of a state’s year-end balance and the amounts in the
state’s stabilization funds. The National Association of State Budget
Ocers reports, ‘‘total balances now are stable, but at levels lower than
those generally considered to provide an adequate scal cushion.’’ 124
Expressed more simply, state nancial conditions have stopped deteriorat-
ing but have not rebounded suciently to weather the next storm.
Other negative signs in the states’ scal picture suggest that the next
storm is rapidly approaching. The relentless rise in Medicaid costs since the
late 1990s has displaced K-12 education as the single largest expenditure
category for state governments. In FY 2003 public education accounted for
21.7 percent of state expenditures and Medicaid 21.4 percent, but these
positions reversed in FY 2004 as Medicaid consumed 21.9 percent and K-12
education constituted 21.5 percent. 125 The percentage change from the
previous scal year in all state funds for Medicaid and for elementary and
secondary education between 2002 and 2003 was 6.6 and 3.2 percent,
respectively, and between 2003 and 2004 the percentage changes were
8.0 and 6.4. State monies devoted to Medicaid are expected to grow
nonstop as prices rise for prescription drugs and for evolving medical
technologies. Medicaid expenditures are also pushed higher by federal
and state actions that expand the program’s coverage to include more low-
income children and their parents, while at the same time the number of
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disabled and ‘‘dual eligible’’ populations (those eligible for Medicare and
Medicaid) increases. The nation’s over-65 population will increase by
26 percent between 2005 and 2015, and even if medical care costs stay
stable state governments will see Medicaid spending rise faster than the
economy grows.126 It is no surprise, then, that all fty states took actions in
2004 to contain Medicaid costs. But these eorts to contain Medicaid costs
encountered strong resistance from advocacy groups.
As Medicaid consumes more and more of state scal resources, monies
for other programs become harder to obtain; yet the demand in these
other areas also grows. Higher-education spending has been reduced,
some would say ravaged, by 7.8 percent between FY 2002 and FY 2004.
Enrollments are on the rise, but recent double-digit increases in tuition
have raised student costs dramatically. Although violent crime has declined
by over 30 percent since 1990, incarcerations are up by over 50 percent
owing primarily to drug-related arrests. The rising number of arrests has
forced widespread construction of new prisons in most states, but even
the adoption of alternative sentencing procedures in many states has not
halted the growth in prison operating costs. Pensions for state and local
government employees require more state contributions because invest-
ment returns have weakened since the dot.com bubble burst. 127 Per pupil
spending for K-12 education is not likely to decline even though
enrollment growth is slowing. The added costs required to educate socially
disadvantaged students, students with various learning disabilities, and
newly arriving immigrant children are often not included in typical state
aid to education formulas. This absence not only strains local school district
revenues (principally property taxes), but also has resulted in two dozen
‘‘adequacy’’ lawsuits in which the plaintis (often certain school districts)
maintain that state public education spending is insucient. 128 Further
pressure for additional elementary and secondary funds arises from the
accountability movement, in particular the federal 2001 NCLB. Federal FY
2004 appropriations for elementary and secondary education were nearly
$37 billion, but this amount constitutes only 10.6 percent of state spending
for public education. 129 The vigorous resistance to the NCLB by many state
education ocials rests on the costs of accountability mandates contained
in the federal act. As long as the amount of money appropriated for the
NCLB is ‘‘‘not even in the ballpark’ of what’s needed for true school reform
programs and accountability’’ states will be faced with the politically painful
choice of refusing to abide by federal requirements, and thus forgoing
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federal aid, or raising additional state and local revenues in the face of
continuing opposition to higher taxes. 130
The combined challenges of Medicaid, K-12 education, and pensions
coupled with the labor market pull for higher education and the rising tide
of drug abuse create huge pressures on state ocials to nd sucient
revenues. If the nation’s economy grows and consumer spending proceeds
at a robust pace, then states and localities may well see a signicant rise in
revenues from sales and income taxes. However, the pressure to return
public services to their precrisis levels will collide with the relentless
demands to lower taxes made by antigovernment groups such as the
Club for Growth and Americans for Tax Reform. No wonder National
Conference of State Legislatures executive director Bill Pound said,
‘‘The 2005 sessions will pose challenges for legislators across America.
With the federal government reducing payments for its share of Medicaid,
and the continued scal strain of No Child Left Behind, there aren’t many
dollars left unspoken for in states.’’ 131
On a positive note, it appears that states and local governments are
rebounding in terms of public opinion concerning their ‘‘value.’’ John
Kincaid and Richard Cole in an article in this issue report the results of
a 2005 poll asking respondents from which level of government they get
the most for their money. States and local governments are the preferred
choice for most respondents—turning around results following the
11 September terrorist attacks, when the federal government outpolled
the other governments.
Election Administration
The administration of elections in the United States is a responsibility of
state governments, and decisions by state ocials, as the nation discovered
in 2000, have the potential to shape the national outcome. Election ocials
perform many tasks; for example, they oversee new voter registration,
decide where to locate polling places, select voting equipment, make
available absentee ballots, determine voter eligibility, and count the votes.
The secretaries of state who are the chief administrators of elections are not
neutral civil servants; instead they are political party members. Because they
may be active in their party’s campaigns, their decisions are sometimes seen
as biased by the other party, and it is not unusual for some of their decisions
to be challenged in court.
The chaotic climax of the 2000 presidential election and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore transformed election law so
that, according to Loyola University law professor Richard L. Hansen,
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it ‘‘has become just another part of the political strategy of the parties.’’ 132
Because of the importance of state administration of elections to the
presidential election outcome, both parties dispatched thousands of
attorneys to battleground states (those where neither presidential candi-
date had an insurmountable lead) to observe and identify election
problems, and if necessary le lawsuits. For example, the Democrats
positioned about 2,000 lawyers in Florida, while the Republicans organized
an army of attorneys stationed in 30,000 precincts around the country. 133
Each side shared concerns about the new digital recording electronic
voting machines (DREs) that were used by about one-third (150 million) of
all voters. Numerous problems with these machines were encountered as
they were installed during the last four years in states such as California and
Ohio. Questions about the absence of a paper record, about privacy and
security, about the training of poll workers, and other matters were raised
about the DREs. 134 Both parties also had concerns about the ‘‘provisional
ballot’’ created by the 2002 Help America Vote Act, which requires state
election ocials to allow voters who arrive at polling places but do not nd
their names on the voter rolls to cast a ‘‘provisional ballot’’ that would be
veried and, if valid, added to the election totals. Both parties also worried
about the abuses possible because of the rapidly growing use of absentee
ballots. More than half of the states now grant absentee ballots without the
requirement that a voter oer one of the traditional excuses of being out of
town on election day or unable to travel to the assigned polling place. States
have made absentee ballots easier to obtain as part of their eort to ease
crowding at the polls and to lower costs. A key decision is how far ahead
of the election absentee ballots will be made available to voters. In 2004
North Carolina began to distribute them in mid-September, nearly two
months ahead of election day. One obvious problem with such a long lead
time is simply that early voters will not have access to events and new
information that occur during the remaining weeks of the campaign.
Absentee ballots also open the door for possible abuse because they bypass
some of the antifraud measures that surround polling booths such as
verifying signatures or requiring proof odentity. 135
It was anticipated that Florida—the state of ‘‘hanging chads’’ and the
‘‘buttery ballot’’—would again be the focal point oegal battles over the
2004 election results. After the 2000 embarrassment, Florida election
ocials engaged in extensive changes in the state’s election procedures
and decertied the notorious punch-card machines, replacing them with
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DREs or optical scanners. However, Florida ocials also took actions that
led to lawsuits, including challenges over voter registration forms, the
acceptance of provisional ballots for voters displaced by the hurricanes
that ravaged the state, and racial bias in the purge of voter rolls. 136 These
problems led former president Jimmy Carter to claim, ‘‘Florida voting
ocials have proved to be highly partisan, brazenly violating a basic need
for an unbiased and universally trusted authority to manage all elements of
the electoral process.’’ 137 Florida was not the only state where lawsuits were
led before the election; for example, two weeks before election day the
use of DREs was challenged in New Jersey, and lawsuits over treatment of
Hispanic voters were led in New Mexico. 138
But in the nal tally, Florida was not ‘‘ground zero’’ of the 2004 election.
Bush carried the state with about 377,000 more votes than Kerry. Instead,
Ohio for a brief moment was poised to be the legal battleground. With
turnout exceptionally high, vote counts ran slow and it was not until early
morning the next day that the television networks declared Bush had
carried Ohio. But there was one nagging problem: the totals did not add up
correctly because of ‘‘provisional ballots.’’ The Kerry team debated the
merits of a court ght, but Senator Kerry decided to forgo any challenge
and he conceded. The day after the election former U.S. Senator Bob
Kerrey (D-NE) called for the federal government to establish national
standards for election administration by the states: ‘‘Right now, these
elections are left up to the individual secretaries of state and laws set by the
legislatures in the states. . . . This is too important to be left up to dierent
standards in dierent states. We’re talking about the presidency for gosh
sake!’’ 139
FEDERALISM IN COURT
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the October 2004 term spanned almost
every type oederalism relationship possible in the United States: federal-
state, federal-local, state-state, Indian-state, and Indian-federal. The
questions ranged from requests for equitable relief to interpretation of
federal statutory requirements to statements of the rights of convicted
individuals and the states responsible for the laws under which they have
been convicted.
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Discussions of the early decisions of the Rehnquist court pointed to the
movement of the Court to allow greater discretion to the states and to
minimize the role of the federal bureaucracy in regulating behavior,
particularly when the state is used as a conduit for that regulation. Recent
analyses by several authors have suggested that the Court is nding it
dicult to maintain the ‘‘federalism revival’’ that was begun in the
1990s.140 This second pattern is stunningly present in the October 2004
decisions. Of the eight decisions discussed here, the state level prevailed on
two—one a search-and-seizure case and the other remanding a decision to
the state court after excising elements of the federal mandatory sentencing
guidelines. Local governments fared better. Local government power
prevailed in both zoning cases brought before the Court.
The case that had the most direct impact on the legislative powers of
another government in the United States is Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183
(2005). In Roper, the Court was asked to consider again the imposition of
the death penalty in cases where a minor committed the crime. Simmons
was 17 years old when he committed the premeditated murder of an elderly
woman. The Missouri jury returned a verdict of capital murder nine
months after the crime was committed and shortly after Simmons turned
18. Simmons appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court for postconviction
relief based on the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Atkins v.
Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments prohibit the execution of mentally ill individuals. The
Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of Simmons. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the question of whether the Eighth and
Fourteenth amendments prohibit the execution of minors.
The U.S. Supreme Court spoke on precisely the same issue in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361(1989). In Roper, the Court voted ve to four to
overturn Stanford, ruling that the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments
do prohibit the execution of minors. As it had in Stanford, it drew on
contemporary standards of decency and Supreme Court practice in making
its decision. The Court found that both of these had changed signicantly
since Stanfordand that neither supported the continued imposition of the
death penalty if the person was younger than 18 when the capital crime was
committed. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist dissented
from the judgment.
The ruling has obvious federalism impacts, as the federal Constitution
is being used to supersede states’ constitutions on an historically state-
determined issue. The decision reveals the ongoing tension within the
Court on federalism issues. The ‘‘type of decision’’ element to the Court’s
ruling indicates that a majority of the Court sees greater involvement in
140Timothy Conlan and Farncosi Verguilolle deChantal, ‘‘The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary
American Federalism,’’ Political Science Quarterly116 (2001): 253–275.
federalist matters as being appropriate. Allowing states to retain power is
still a question for this Court.
The Court issued two other decisions that dealt with the administration
of state criminal law, both changing administrative procedure. The rst of
these, Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (2005), reviewed the California
Department of Corrections unwritten policy of segregating prisoners based
on race into two-man cells upon entry or transfer from another facility.
After the initial segregation, which was used to assess the likelihood of
violent behavior, inmates were able to select their own cell mates. Johnson
argued that this constituted an impermissible use of race by the state and
violated his right to equal protection. The District Court granted summary
judgment to California after discovery, ‘‘on the grounds that [the
administrators] were entitled to qualied immunity because their conduct
was not clearly unconstitutional.’’ The District Court cited Turner,141 which
allows for deference to the state when assessing challenges to the
management of prisons. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals armed.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, noting that
where classications based on race are questioned, a court must use the
strict scrutiny standard of review. That level of review—the most rigorous in
civil cases—requires that the state show that it is using the most narrowly
tailored alternative to accomplish a legitimate government function.
Control of a prison is clearly a legitimate government function. The
Supreme Court drew on the experiences of the other states and the federal
government to demonstrate that the segregation of prisoners is not a
narrowly tailored alternative. The qualied immunity of the administrators
was left intact; the use of race as a criterion for decision making was
changed. The dissents, one written by Justice Stevens and the other written
by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Scalia, stressed the state’s
purported need for control. Justice Stevens dissented from the majority’s
failure to address the actual question—whether the action of the state rose
to the level of a violation of equal protection. Justice Stevens opined that
those actions did. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented to the requirement
of using the most narrowly tailored alternative, as the prison environment
creates special pressures that the state must be allowed to address in the
most eective manner. This was the argument supported by a majority of
the Court in Turner.
In the second case involving the management of prisoners, the Court
ruled in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005), that prisoners can
challenge the constitutionality of state parole proceedings using 42 U.S.C.
§1983 rather than relying solely on habeas corpus actions. The State of
141In Turner v. Saey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court held the proper balancing test when assessing
restrictions on the exercise oreedoms by prisoners ‘‘reasonably related’’ to ‘‘legitimate penological
interests’’ (p. 89) The Court in Johnson v. California ruled that because the state could avoid using
race—a suspect classication—in making its determinations, the Turner test should not be used.
Ohio argued that allowing the use of section 1983 to challenge any element
of the parole process will result in a violation oederalist principles. The
majority dismissed this concern, noting that
earlier cases, however, have placed the States’ important comity
considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing
need to vindicate federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded
that prisoners may bring their claims without fully exhausting state-
court remedies so long as their suits, if established, would not
necessarily invalidate state-imposed connement. . . . Thus, we see no
reason for moving the line these cases draw—particularly since
Congress has already strengthened the requirement that prisoners
exhaust state administrative remedies as a precondition to any §1983
action.
The implications of Johnsonand Dotsonrun to administrative elements of
federalism. Of course, in Johnson the Court made more dicult the
processes by which states can regulate prisons. More important is the fact
that this decision has the potential to expand to all other state-run
institutions where the individuals are subject to state control. The standard
could be used by anyone in a protected class to argue for the same
‘‘narrowly tailored alternative’’ response to state needs. The Court has
raised the bar for the states in accomplishing legitimate state responsibil-
ities. Similarly, Dotsonprovided a second course by which prisoners can
challenge their connement. The Court did not reinstate the broad view of
habeas corpus proceedings removed by Congress, but it did carve out an
avenue of review not recognized before Congress’s actions in limiting
judicial review of continued incarceration. 142
The Court decided two cases to which local governments were a party.
Both of these opinions report a victory for local zoning powers. In City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (2005), the Court
addressed the question of whether the nation’s purchase oand that was
once part of the tribe’s original territory allowed the Oneida Indian Nation
the right to refuse to pay state and local taxes on that land. The Court ruled
that fundamental considerations of equity required that the City of Sherrill
be permitted to continue collecting taxes on the property. The claim of
ownership by the tribal government was asserted too late, as over 200 years
had passed with the city providing infrastructure services without complaint
by the Oneida Indian Nation.
The Court armed the right oocal governments to continue to
control the zoning of their community, even in the face of national
legislation that has the capacity to supersede local control. In Rancho Palos
Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S.Ct. 1453 (2005), the Court was asked to arm the
use of 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce the right to site a wireless communication
antenna under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The primary
142See 28 U.S.C. §2254.
legislative purpose of the act is to provide for national uniformity of wireless
services. This goal is forwarded by the requirement that local governments
have legitimate bases for denying special use permits and that those bases
be fully documented through the public record. Abrams, after a continuing
battle to build and use antennae for commercial purposes, was denied the
special exemption necessary to use of the antenna on his property. He did
not appeal the denial within the thirty-day period required by the statute.
Having missed the statutorily created statute oimitation, Abrams sought
relief using 42 U.S.C. §1983, which prohibits the state from taking action
that abridges the rights ondividuals. Section 1983 actions can only arise
from rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. 143
The Court ruled that the Telecommunications Act does not support the
use of section 1983 to obtain injunctive relierom local governments who
legitimately deny relevant zoning requests.
Two cases raised issues posedby a constitutionally created government. In
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 125 S.Ct. 1172 (2005), the Court was asked
to decide whether the U.S. government had to pay the Indian tribes under
contracts through which the tribes administered services that the U.S.
government would otherwise have administered. Two cases were consoli-
dated under this opinion. The case of most interest involves the Shoshone-
Paiute and Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma contracts. The U.S. government
contracted with these tribes for the tribes to provide health-care services
to their members. When each tribe sought reimbursement from the
government under the relevant contract, the Department of the Interior
refused to pay, claiming that Congress had not appropriated enough
money to allow payment and therefore the government had no responsi-
bility to pay. The government attempted to show that these contractual
relationships were special and distinct from normal procurement contracts
between the government and other parties. The government also argued
that various elements of the statute allowed the government to consider the
contracts with the tribes nonbinding. The Court found none of these
arguments persuasive and ruled unanimously that the U.S. government
had to pay the Indian tribes.
In its October 2004 term the Court revisited the questions posed by the
ongoing conict between Kansas and Colorado over the use of water from
the Arkansas River in Kansas v. Colorado, 125 S.Ct. 944 (2005). The case
began in 1985, when Kansas alleged that Colorado had been in violation of
the Arkansas River Compact for almost two decades. After years oitigation
and arbitration, the two states nally reached the point at which nal
determinations on damages and future compensation to Kansas by
143See http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm (accessed 27 May 2005), fn. 33,
citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979).
Colorado were assessed by a special master. Kansas disagreed with several
specic recommendations by the special master to the Supreme Court and
appealed to the Court for additional relief, including continuing oversight
by a special master. The Court denied all of Kansas’s requests for relief. Of
particular importance to federalism concerns is the refusal of Kansas’s
request for a special master to monitor the enforcement of the Court’s nal
decree. The Court noted that the enforcement of the decree would likely
involve making choices grounded in the public policy of each state and that
those decisions would aect the legal rights of each state. Given the nature
of the decisions, the appointment of a special master was rejected. The
decision to refuse to appoint another special master removed the Court
from this phase of the management of the compact between Kansas and
Colorado, resulting in a return to state control of the water. In this case, the
Court armed the power of the states to direct their own policy agenda
and to work through the problems of state to state relations.
The role oederal mandatory sentencing guidelines has already
received attention in Publius, where the Court’s Blakely decision resulted
in the invalidation of a Washington state court’s sentence. 144 The Court
revisited the federal mandatory sentencing guidelines in United States v.
Booker.145 In Booker the Court was asked to overturn a sentence that
exceeded the relevant mandatory sentencing guideline. Instead of directly
granting or denying that request, the Court excised elements of the
guidelines and then ordered that the District and Appellate courts apply
the guidelines as altered by the decision. The section of the opinion that
ordered this extraordinary step was written by Justice Breyer, who was an
author of the guidelines and had dissented from the Blakelyopinion. The
Booker opinion most likely saved the rest of the federal sentencing
guidelines, but that question still remains, leaving for another day the
decision on the issue of whether the guidelines can override a state court’s
sentencing procedure.
Bookerand the other opinions issued following the October 2004 term
have changed portions of the federalism landscape. More suits are allowed,
legislation has been radically altered, and minors can no longer be
executed. The most important insight from the review of these cases is the
nature of how the Court is changing federalism. Pickerell asserts that the
Court is not making the states more powerful but instead is attempting to
144Krane, ‘‘The State of American Federalism, 2003–2004,’’ 143–144.
145The decision in Bookerwas the best example of a plurality decision in recent Court history.
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delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Kennedy and
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limit the power of Congress. 146 Other authors agree with this interpretation
of the trend in the Court’s rulings. 147 Taken in this light, with the
exception of Roper, all of the cases discussed here are a rational outcome of
a consistent judicial logic. This foundation for the analyses of these cases is
less than satisfactory for students oederalism as the foundation posits that
separation of powers and limitations on branches are the motivating forces
behind what was supposed to be a federalism revolution. Pickerell nds
some hope for advances in federalism:
. . . The Court is neither the end-all-be-all denier of national
democratic preferences as political safeguards advocates worry nor
the savior of states as judicial safeguards proponents claim. While
the boundaries oederalism will be debated, established, and
re-established in the political process, the Court and states should
both be important actors in that process. The Court is not at the center
of the federalism universe and scholars should not treat it as such. The
Court’s federalism jurisprudence will not be self executing; it does,
however, provide new context and leverage for state and local interests
in the national policymaking process if they choose to utilize and to
not squander the opportunity. 148
CONCLUSION
The absence oederalism as an issue in the 2004 presidential contest was
not a matter of ‘‘forgetfulness’’ 149 nor solely a matter of the centralization
that often accompanies the response to a national crisis or threat. 150
Instead, the disappearance oederalism as an important political issue is
more a product of political changes that have been occurring over the past
decade but accelerated during the rst four years of Bush’s tenure. From
1968 to 2000, American national government was ‘‘divided government’’—
no political party controlled the White House and both chambers of
Congress—but for the rst time in over three decades one party holds the
reins of government. Furthermore, the power of the Republican Party
is enhanced by its dominance of a majority of state governments, as
evidenced by the number of governors and state legislators who are
members of the party. A key to the Republican Party’s success has been its
ability to build a centralized, integrated political organization that guides
party strategy not just at the national level but also at the state and local
levels. This intergovernmental political network is composed not just of
146Michael Pickerell, ‘‘Leveraging Federalism: The Real Meaning of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Jurisprudence for States,’’ Albany Law Review66 (Spring 2003): 825–834.
147David G. Savage, ‘‘Finite Federalism.’’ ABA Journal 90 (1 July 2004): 20.
148Pickerell, ‘‘Leveraging Federalism,’’ 832.
149Christopher Hamilton and Donald T. Wells, Federalism, Power, and Political Economy: A New Theory
of Federalism’s Impact on American Life(Englewood Clis, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 1.
150G. Ross Stephens and Nelson Wikstrom, ‘‘A Century of Evolving Intergovernmental Relations:
A Longitudinal Analysis of the Roles of Federal, State, and Local Governments’’ (paper presented at
the 1999 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2 September, Atlanta, GA).
party ocials and members; it also includes a wide array onterest groups,
nonprot organizations (e.g., churches, ‘‘527’’ organizations), and media
personalities.
William Riker explained that the structure of political parties was a key
intervening variable between the background social conditions of a nation
and the nature of the nation’s federal bargain. 151 Elazar pointed out that
‘‘recent studies have shown that the existence of a noncentralized party
system is perhaps the most important single element in the maintenance of
federal noncentralization.’’ In the United States this ‘‘noncentralization’’
derived from long-standing practices whereby ‘‘party nancing and
decision-making are dispersed either among the state organizations or
among widely divergent factions operating nationwide.’’ 152 But more
recently David Walker disagreed with Elazar’s perception by noting that
‘‘parties, politics, and pressure groups have become nationalized over the
past quarter century.’’ 153 Because of these trends toward a more centralized
party and policy system, Walker asked, ‘‘Is Federalism still a core value?’’ 154
His answer was that the ‘‘noncentralizing features of contemporary
American federalism—although signicant—still leave the constituent
governments and their localities partially at the mercy both of unilateral
interventionist actions of national government ocials and of hostile
pressure tactics onterest groups in Washington that do not defer to the
federalist principle.’’ 155
American politics and government in 2004 oered ample evidence
that Walker’s judgment is sound. With little countervailing force from
the Democrats, the Republican Party may be near the point where its
intergovernmental network can override the Madisonian institutional
protections against a strong majority (the horizontal and vertical division
of power) contained in the U.S. Constitution (see The Federalist, no. 51). If,
as Elazar has argued, ‘‘noncentralized parties are necessary for the proper
functioning oederal government,’’ 156 then the changes occurring in the
American party system, as manifested in the elections of 2004, may well
signal an important shift in American federal relationships. Could it be that
President Bush’s inattention to federalism is a indication that it does not
matter because his party’s policy preferences can be achieved using the
party’s centralized organization to overcome the dispersed and fragmented
authority characteristic of American federalism?
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